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Abstract. Applications of elliptic curve cryptography to anonymity, privacy and censorship circumvention call for
methods to represent uniformly random points on elliptic curves as uniformly random bit strings, so that, for example,
ECC network traffic can masquerade as random traffic.
At ACM CCS 2013, Bernstein et al. proposed an efficient approach, called “Elligator,” to solving this problem for
arbitrary elliptic curve-based cryptographic protocols, based on the use of efficiently invertible maps to elliptic curves.
Unfortunately, such invertible maps are only known to exist for certain classes of curves, excluding in particular curves
of prime order and curves over binary fields. A variant of this approach, “Elligator Squared,” was later proposed by
Tibouchi (FC 2014) supporting not necessarily injective encodings to elliptic curves (and hence a much larger class of
curves), but, although some rough efficiency estimates were provided, it was not clear how an actual implementation
of that approach would perform in practice.
In this paper, we show that Elligator Squared can indeed be implemented very efficiently with a suitable choice of
curve encodings. More precisely, we consider the binary curve setting (which was not discussed in Tibouchi’s paper),
and implement the Elligator Squared bit string representation algorithm based on a suitably optimized version of the
Shallue–van de Woestijne characteristic 2 encoding, which we show can be computed using only multiplications,
trace and half-trace computations, and a few inversions.
On the fast binary curve of Oliveira et al. (CHES 2013), our implementation runs in an average of only 22850 Haswell
cycles, making uniform bit string representations possible for a very reasonable overhead—much smaller even than
Elligator on Edwards curves.
As a side contribution, we also compare implementations of Elligator and Elligator Squared on a curve supported
by Elligator, namely Curve25519. We find that generating a random point and its uniform bitstring representation
is around 35–40% faster with Elligator for protocols using a fixed base point (such as static ECDH), but 30–35%
faster with Elligator Squared in the case of a variable base point (such as ElGamal encryption). Both are significantly
slower than our binary curve implementation.
Keywords: Elligator, Binary Elliptic Curves, Efficient Implementation, PCLMULQDQ, Anonymity & Privacy.
1 Introduction
Elliptic curves offer many advantages for public-key cryptography compared to more traditional settings
like RSA and finite field discrete logarithms, including higher efficiency, a much smaller key size that scales
gracefully with security requirements, and a rich geometric structure that enables the construction of additional
primitives like bilinear pairings. On the Internet, adoption of elliptic curve cryptography is growing in general-
purpose protocols like TLS, SSH and S/MIME, as well as anonymity and privacy-enhancing tools like Tor
(which favors ECDH key exchange in recent versions) and Bitcoin (which is based on ECDSA).
For circumvention applications, however, ECC presents a weakness: points on a given elliptic curve, when
represented in a usual way (even in compressed form) are easy to distinguish from random bit strings. For
example, the usual compressed bit string representation of an elliptic curve point is essentially the x-coordinate
of the point, and only about half of all possible x-coordinates correspond to valid points (the other half being
x-coordinates of points of the quadratic twist). This makes it relatively easy for an attacker to distinguish
ECC traffic (the transcripts of multiple ECDH key exchanges, say) from random traffic, and then proceed to
intercept, block or otherwise tamper with such traffic.
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To alleviate that problem, one possible approach is to modify protocols so that transmitted points randomly
lie either on the given elliptic curve or on its quadratic twist (and the curve parameters must therefore be
chosen to be twist-secure). This is the approach taken by Mo¨ller [23], who constructed a CCA-secure KEM
with uniformly random ciphertexts using an elliptic curve and its twist. This approach has also been used in
the context of kleptography, as considered by Young and Yung [30,31], and has already been deployed in
circumvention tools, including StegoTorus [28], a camouflage proxy for Tor, and Telex [29], an anticensorship
technology that uses a covert channel in TLS handshakes to securely communicate with friendly proxy servers.
However, since protocols and security proofs have to be adapted to work on both a curve and its twist, this
approach is not particularly versatile, and it imposes additional security requirements (twist-security) on the
choice of curve parameters.
A different approach, called “Elligator,” was presented at ACM CCS 2013 by Bernstein, Hamburg,
Krasnova and Lange [6]. Their idea is to leverage an efficiently computable, efficiently invertible algebraic
function that maps the integer interval S = {0, . . . , (p− 1)/2}, p prime, injectively to the group E(Fp) where
E is an elliptic curve over Fp. Bernstein et al. observe that, since ι is injective, a uniformly random point P
in ι(S) ⊂ E(Fp) has a uniformly random preimage ι−1(P ) in S, and use that observation to represent an
elliptic curve point P as the bit string representation of the unique integer ι−1(P ) if it exists. If the prime p is
close to a power of 2, a uniform point in ι(S) will have a close to uniform bit string representation.
This method has numerous advantages over Mo¨ller’s twisted curve method: it is easier to adapt to existing
protocols using elliptic curves, since there is no need to modify them to also deal with the quadratic twist; it
avoids the need to publish a twisted curve counterpart of each public key element, hence allowing a more
compact public key; and it doesn’t impose additional security requirements like twist-security. But it crucially
relies on the existence of an injective encoding ι, only a few examples of which are known [13,17,6], all of
them for elliptic curves of non-prime order over large characteristic fields. This makes the method inapplicable
to implementations based on curves of prime order or on binary fields, which rules out most standardized
ECC parameters [15,11,22,1], in particular. Moreover, the rejection sampling involved (when a point P is
picked outside ι(S), the protocol has to start over) can impose a significant performance penalty.
To overcome these limitations, Tibouchi [27] recently proposed a variant of Elligator, called “Elligator
Squared,” in which a point P ∈ E(Fq) is represented not by a preimage under an injective encoding ι, but
by a randomly sampled preimage under an essentially surjective map F2q → E(Fq) with good statistical
properties, known as an admissible encoding following a terminology introduced by Brier et al. [10]. By
results due to Farashahi et al. [14], such admissible encodings are known to exist for all isomorphism
classes of elliptic curves, including curves of prime order and binary curves. Since admissible encodings are
essentially surjective, the approach also eliminates the need for rejection sampling at the protocol level.
Our contributions. While the Elligator Squared approach is quite versatile, its efficiency is highly dependent
on how fast the underlying admissible encoding can be computed and sampled, and the same can be said of
Elligator in the settings were it can be used. Since, to the best of our knowledge, no detailed implementation
results or concrete performance numbers have been published so far for the underlying encodings, one only
has some rough estimates to go by. For Elligator, Bernstein et al. give ballpark Westmere cycle count figures
based on earlier implementation results [7], and for Elligator Squared, Tibouchi provides some average
operation counts in [27] for a few selected encoding functions. No performance-oriented implementation is
available for either approach.
In this paper, we provide the first such implementation for Elligator Squared, and do so in the binary curve
setting, which had not been considered by Tibouchi. Binary curves provide a major advantage for algorithms
like Elligator Squared due to the existence of a point encoding function, the binary Shallue–van de Woestijne
encoding [25], that can be computed without base field exponentiations. Using the framework of Farashahi et
al. [14], one can obtain an admissible encoding from that function, and hence use it to implement Elligator
Squared.
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We propose various algorithmic improvements and computation tricks to obtain a fast evaluation of the
binary Shallue–van de Woestijne encoding and of the associated Elligator Squared sampling algorithm. In
particular, our description is much more efficient than the one given in [9, Appendix E].
Based on these algorithmic improvements, we performed software implementations of Elligator Squared
on the record-setting binary GLS curve of Oliveira et al. , defined over F2254 [24]. We dedicate special attention
to optimizing the performance-critical operations and introduce corresponding novel techniques, namely a new
point addition formula in λ-affine coordinates and a faster approach for constant-time half-trace computation
over quadratic extensions of F2m . Moreover, timings are presented for both variable-time and constant-time
field arithmetic.6 The resulting timings compare very favorably to previously suggested estimates.
Finally, as a side contribution, we also propose concrete cycle counts on Ivy Bridge and Haswell for
both Elligator and Elligator Squared on the Edwards curve Curve25519 [4] based on the publicly available
implementation of Ed25519 [5]. We find that, on this curve, the Elligator approach is roughly 35–40%
faster than Elligator Squared for protocols that rely on fixed-base scalar multiplication, such as ECDH, but
conversely, for protocols that rely on variable-base scalar multiplication like ElGamal encryption, Elligator
Squared is 30–35% faster. Both approaches are significantly slower than what we achieve on the same CPU
with our binary curve implementation.
2 Preliminaries
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field Fq.
2.1 Well-bounded encodings
Definition 1. A function f : Fq → E(Fq) is said to be B-well-distributed encoding for a certain constant
B > 0 if for any nontrivial character χ of E(Fq), the following holds:
∣∣∣∣
∑
u∈Fq
χ(f(u))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ B√q.
Definition 2. We call a function f : Fq → E(Fq) a (d,B)-well-bounded encoding, for positive constants
d,B, when f is B-well-distributed and all points in E(Fq) have at most d preimages under f .
2.2 Elligator Squared
Let f : Fq → E(Fq) be a (d,B)-well-bounded encoding and let f⊗2 the tensor square defined by:
f⊗2 : F2q → E(Fq)
(u, v) 7→ f(u) + f(v).
Tibouchi shows in [27] that if we sample a uniformly random preimage under f⊗2 of a uniformly random
point P on the curve, we get a pair (u, v) ∈ F2q which is statistically close to uniform. Moreover he proves
that sampling uniformly random preimages under f⊗2 can be done efficiently for all points P ∈ E(Fq)
except possibly a negligible fraction of them [27, Theorem 1]. The sampling algorithm Tibouchi proposed is
described as Algorithm 1. The idea is to randomly pick a random u and then to compute a correct candidate v
such that P = f(u) + f(v). The last steps of the algorithm (step 5 to 7) are also needed in order to ensure the
uniform distribution of the output (u, v).
6 We point out that using constant-time arithmetic for Elligator Squared is not required in most realistic adversarial models, but it
does offer protection against very powerful distinguishing attackers, so the paranoid may prefer that option nonetheless.
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Algorithm 1 Preimage sampling algorithm for f⊗2.
1: function SAMPLEPREIMAGE(P )
2: repeat
3: u
$
← Fq
4: Q← P − f(u)
5: i← #f−1(Q)
6: j
$
← {1, · · · , d}
7: until j ≤ i
8: {v1, · · · , vt} ← f
−1(Q)
9: return (u, vj)
10: end function
2.3 Shallue–van de Woestijne in Characteristic 2
In this section, we recall the Shallue–van de Woestijne algorithm in characteristic 2 [25], following the
more explicit presentation given in [9, Appendix E]. An elliptic curve over a field F2n is a set of points
(x, y) ∈ (F2n)2 verifying the equation:
Ea,b : Y
2 +X · Y = X3 + a ·X2 + b
where a, b ∈ (F2n)2. Let g be the rational function x 7→ x−2 · (x3 + a · x2 + b). Letting Z = Y/X , the
equation for Ea,b can be rewritten as Z
2 + Z = g(X).
Theorem 1. Let g(x) = x−2 · (x3 + a · x2 + b) where a, b ∈ (F2n)2. Let
X1(t, w) =
t · c
1 + t+ t2
X2(t, w) = t ·X1(t, w) + c X3(t, w) = X1(t, w) ·X2(t, w)
X1(t, w) +X2(t, w)
where c = a + w + w2. Then g(X1(t, w)) + g(X2(t, w)) + g(X3(t, w)) ∈ h(F2n) where h is the map
h : z 7→ z2 + z.
From Theorem 1, we have that at least one of the g(Xi(t, w)) must be in h(F2n), which leads to a
point in Ea,b(F2n). Indeed, we have that h(F2n) = {z ∈ F2n | Tr(z) = 0}, where Tr is the trace operator
Tr : F2n → F2 with:
Tr =
n−1∑
i=0
z2
i
(one inclusion is obvious and the other one follows from the fact that the kernel of the F2-linear map h
is {0, 1}, hence its image is a hyperplane). As a result,∑3i=1Tr(g(Xi)) = 0 and therefore at least one of
the Xi must satisfy Tr(g(Xi)) = 0 since Tr is F2-valued. Such an Xi is indeed the abscissa of a point in
Ea,b(F2n), and we can find its y-coordinate by solving the quadratic equation Z
2+Z = g(Xi). That equation
is F2-linear, so finding Z amounts to solving a linear system over F2. This yields the point-encoding function
described in Algorithm 2.
In the description of that algorithm, the solution of the quadratic equation is expressed in terms of the
map QS : F2n → F2n (“quadratic solver”), which is the well-defined linear map such that, for all x, QS(x) is
the trace zero solution of the quadratic equation z2 + z = x+Tr(x). When n is odd, QS is straightforward
to compute: it is the half-trace map HTr defined as:
HTr : z 7→
(n−1)/2∑
i=0
z2
2i
.
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Algorithm 2 Shallue–van de Woestijne algorithm in characteristic 2.
Require: a, b ∈ F2n and t, w ∈ F2n
Ensure: (x, y) ∈ Ea,b
1: c← a+ w + w2
2: X1 ← t · c/(1 + t+ t
2)
3: X2 ← t ·X1 + c
4: X3 ← X1 ·X2/(X1 +X2)
5: for j = 1 to 3 do
6: hj ← (X
3
j + a ·X
2
j + b)/X
2
j
7: if Tr(hj) = 0 then return (Xj ,QS(hj) ·Xj)
8: end if
9: end for
We discuss the efficient computation of QS in even degree extensions in §4.
Algorithm 2 actually maps two parameters t, w to a rational point on the curve Ea,b. One can obtain a
map f : Fq → Ea,b(Fq) by picking one of the two parameters as a suitable constant and letting the other one
vary. In what follows, for efficiency reasons, we fix t and use w as the variable parameter.
One can check that the resulting function is well-bounded in the sense of §2.1. Indeed, the framework of
Farashahi et al. [14] can be used to establish that it is a well-distributed encoding: the proof is easily adapted
from the one given in [18] for the positive characteristic version of the Shallue–van de Woestijne algorithm.
Moreover, each curve point has at most 6 preimages under the corresponding function: there are at most two
values of w that yield a given value of X1, and similarly for X2, X3. Thus, we obtain a (d,B)-well-bounded
encoding for an explicitly computable constant B and d = 6.
2.4 Lambda affine coordinates
In order to have more efficient binary elliptic curve arithmetic, we will use lambda coordinates [24]. Given
a point P = (x, y) ∈ Ea,b(F2n), with x 6= 0, its λ-affine representation of P is defined as (x, λ) where
λ = x + y/x. The λ-affine equation of the Weierstrass Equation of the curve y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b is
(λ2 + λ + a)x2 = x4 + b. Note that the condition x 6= 0 is not restrictive in practice since the only point
x = 0 satisfying Weierstrass equation is (0,
√
b).
3 Algorithmic aspects
We focus on Algorithm 1 proposed by Tibouchi in [27], which we adapt for the specific characteristic 2 finite
field. More precisely, we consider an elliptic curve over a field F2n that satisfies the equation in λ-coordinates:
Ea,b : (λ
2 + λ+ a)X2 = X4 + b
where a, b ∈ (F2n)2. The (6, B)-well-bounded encoding we consider for our efficient Elligator Squared
implementation is the binary Shallue–van de Woestijne algorithm recalled in §2.3.
One of its properties is that among three candidates denoted X1, X2, X3, either exactly one of them or
all three are x-coordinate of a rational point over the binary elliptic curve Ea,b, and the algorithm outputs
the first correct one. Owing to this property, some additionnal verifications during preimage computation,
since it is not always true that SWCHAR2X(SWCHAR2
−1
X (Xi)) = Xi for i = 2, 3, where we denote by
SWCHAR2X the x-coordinate of the binary Shallue–van de Woestijne algorithm, and by SWCHAR2
−1
X an
arbitrary preimage thereof (see the discussion on the subroutine PREIMAGESSW in §3.3 for more details). We
also have to consider another property of this algorithm, concerning the output. Indeed the y-coordinate has
a specific form and thus, before searching for some preimages of the point Q, one has to test whether this
property is verified (see the discussion on the overall complexity in §3.3 for more details).
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The details of our preimage sampling algorithm in characteristic 2 are described in Algorithm 3 with t
fixed to a constant such that t(t+ 1)(t2 + t+ 1) 6= 0, i.e. t 6∈ F4. Note that we make the choice to use the
λ-coordinates for efficiency reasons justified in §3.2. The rest of the section consists in describing the two
subroutines SWCHAR2 and PREIMAGESSW, as well as in evaluating the overall complexity of Algorithm 3.
3.1 The subroutine SWCHAR2
The first subroutine represents the binary Shallue–van de Woestijne algorithm and its pseudocode for our case
is given as Algorithm 4. Given a value u ∈ F2n , it outputs the lambda coordinates of a point over the binary
elliptic curve Ea,b.
Since the field inversion is by far the most expensive field operation (see [24] for experimental timings
and Table 2 below), we have modified Algorithm 2 so that we have a single inversion of c to perform. Indeed
Algorithm 2 requires at most 4 field inversions: the first one at step 4 and the three others at step 6. However
the parameters Xi and 1/Xi for j = 1, 2, 3 can be expressed using c, 1/c and some constants depending
on t which can be precomputed (see Table 1). Note that X3 can be computed as c · t3, or more efficiently
as X1 + X2 + c but this requires to keep in memory X1 and X2. Finally this algorithm requires a single
field inversion, a QS computation and some negligible field operations (multiplications, squarings and trace
computations).
X1 ← t1 · c 1/X1 ← 1/t1 · 1/c
X2 ← t2 · c 1/X2 ← 1/t2 · 1/c
X3 ← X1 +X2 + c 1/X3 ← 1/t3 · 1/c
Table 1. Efficient computation of values Xi and 1/Xi for i = 1, · · · 3. The values t1 =
t
1+t+t2
, 1/t1, t2 =
1+t
1+t+t2
, 1/t2 and
1/t3 =
1+t+t2
t(1+t)
can be precomputed, with t a constant such that t 6∈ F4.
3.2 The subroutine PREIMAGESSW
The second subroutine is useful to compute the number of preimages of the point Q = (xQ, λQ) by
Algorithm 4. Its pseudocode is detailed as Algorithm 5 and refers to the steps 5 and 8 of Algorithm 1.
This subroutine is more complex due to the properties of the binary Shallue–van de Woestijne algorithm.
More precisely, there is an order relation in Algorithm 4: if X1 corresponds to a x-coordinate of a point over
Algorithm 3 Preimage Sampling Algorithm in Characteristic 2
1: Precomputed: t1 =
t
1+t+t2
, t2 =
1+t
1+t+t2
, t3 =
t(1+t)
1+t+t2
2: function SAMPLEPREIMAGE(Ea,b, P = (xP , λP ))
3: repeat
4: repeat
5: u
$
← F2n
6: R← SWCHAR2(Ea,b, u, t1, t2, t3)
7: Q← P −R
8: until Tr(λQ − xQ) = 0
9: k, S = {v1, · · · , vk} ← PREIMAGESSW(Ea,b, Q, t1, t2, t3)
10: j
$
← {1, · · · , 6}
11: until j ≤ k
12: return (u, vj)
13: end function
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Algorithm 4 Efficient Binary Shallue–van de Woestijne Algorithm
1: function SWCHAR2(Ea,b, u, t1, t2, t3)
2: c← u2 + u+ a
3: c
−1 ← 1/c
4: for j = 1 to 3 do ⊲ Compute hj and perform a trace test
5: Xj ← tj · c ⊲ orX3 ← X1 +X2 + c
6: X
−j ← 1/tj · c−1 ⊲ 1/tj can also be precomputed
7: hj ← (X−j)
2 · b+Xj + a
8: if Tr(hj) = 0 then ⊲ At least one of the three potential tests will succeed
9: x← Xj
10: λ← QS(hj) + x
11: break ⊲ Only take into account the first correct solution
12: end if
13: end for
14: return (x, λ) ⊲ Lambda coordinates of a point over Ea,b
15: end function
the elliptic curve, then it will output this point, even if X2 and X3 also correspond to a possible x-coordinate.
Thus, the equality SWCHAR2(SWCHAR2−1(Xj)) = Xj is true for j = 1 but not necessarly for j = 2, 3. In
others words, for j = 2, 3 a solution of SWCHAR2−1(Xj) is not necessarily a preimage ofXj by SWCHAR2.
Starting from the equations xQ = Xj(t, w) = c(w) · tj for j = 1, 2, 3, with c(w) = w2 + w + a, the
main idea of Algorithm 5 consists in testing if there exists some values of w which satisfy these equations.
If one founds some candidates for w, one also has to verify if they really correspond to preimages by
Algorithm 4. From an equation xQ = Xj(t, w) we can obtain an equation w + w
2 = xQ/tj − a = αj(a, t)
which has 2 solutions if Tr(αj(a, t)) = 0 and no solution otherwise. As an example α1(a, t) is equal to
xQ · (1 + t+ t2)/t− a. The solutions are then w10 = QS(αj(a, t)) and w11 = w10 + 1. There are thus at most
6 possible solutions for all values of j. Now for the cases xQ = X2(t, w) and xQ = X3(t, w), it remains
to perform a verification. Actually, denoting w20 one of both solutions of the equation xQ = X2(t, w) if it
exists, the computation of SWCHAR2(w20) can result in X1(t, w
2
0) instead of X2(t, w
2
0), and this happens
with probability 1/2 which is the probability that Tr(h1) = 0. The same result holds for xQ = X3(t, w),
however note that if X3 is solution but not X1 then X2 cannot be a solution since
∑3
i=1Tr(g(Xi)) = 0
according to Theorem 1. Thus the verification can focus only on X1.
Naive implementation of the verification. A simple way for implementing the verification would consist in
computing QS(αj(a, t)) for j = 2, 3 and then calling twice the subroutine SWCHAR2 (without the steps
referring to X2 and X3) for testing if the test on the trace is true or not. However this would require an
additional inversion per call to compute SWCHAR2. Moreover, with this naive implementation we have to
compute the half trace before testing if the result will be a preimage.
Efficient implementation of the verification. Since the verification focus only on X1 as explained above, we
propose an efficient way to compute b/X21 , which is required in order to performing the testTr(h1) = Tr(X1+
a+ b/X21 ), without any field inversion. This trick is valuable when we are working in lambda coordinates.
Our proposal has another advantage: we do not need to compute the solutions, i.e. w0 = QS(αj(a, t)) and
w1 = w0 + 1, before to be sure that we will get two preimages. We thus save some quite expensive half trace
computations.
Consider the equation:
xQ = X2 = t2 · c = t2 ·X1/t1 with c = QS(α2(a, t))2 +QS(α2(a, t)) + a.
X1 can be expressed as t1/t2 · xQ, whose computation is negligible for t1/t2 a precomputed value. Now
starting from the equation of the elliptic curve in affine coordinates, i.e Ea,b : Y
2 +X · Y = X3 + a ·X2 + b,
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Algorithm 5 Preimages Computation by Algorithm 4
1: function PREIMAGESSW(Ea,b, Q = (xQ, λQ), t1, t2, t3)
2: k ← 0
3: S ← {}
4: for j = 1 to 3 do ⊲ From xQ = Xj(t, w)...
5: αj ← xQ · 1/tj − a
6: if Tr(αj) = 0 then ⊲ ...Test if there are some solutions
7: if j = 1 then ⊲ ForX1, a solution is a preimage
8: w0 ← QS(αj)
9: w1 ← w0 + 1
10: k ← 2
11: S ← {w0, w1}
12: else ⊲ ForX2, X3, a solution is not necessarly a preimage
13: X1 ← t1/tj · xQ
14: tmp← [(λQ − xQ)
2 + (λQ − xQ)− xQ − a] · (tj/t1)
2 ⊲ tmp = b/X21
15: h1 ← tmp+X1 + a
16: if Tr(h1) 6= 0 then ⊲ Test ifX1 would also be a correct x-coordinate
17: w0 ← QS(αj)
18: w1 ← w0 + 1
19: k ← k + 2
20: S ← S ∪ {w0, w1}
21: end if
22: end if
23: end if
24: end for
25: return k, S ⊲ k: number of preimages, S: set of preimages
26: end function
we divide each term by X2 and we evaluate the equation in the point Q. We then obtain:
(
yQ
xQ
)2
+
yQ
xQ
= xQ + a+
b
x2Q
,
and finally:
b
X21
=
(
t2
t1
)2
·
[(
yQ
xQ
)2
+
yQ
xQ
− xQ − a
]
.
Assuming that (t2/t1)
2 is a precomputed constant, the computation of b/X21 is not costly if yQ/xQ does
not require an expensive operation. That is the case when we are working in λ-coordinates since λQ =
yQ/xQ + xQ. The same result obviously holds for the equation xQ = X3 by replacing t2 with t3.
To conclude, Algorithm 5 requires at most 3 QS computations and some negligible field operations
(multiplications, squarings and trace computations).
3.3 Operation counts
We conclude this section by evaluating the average number of operations needed to evaluate Algorithm 3.
Proposition 1. An evaluation of Algorithm 3 on a uniformly random curve points requires, on average and
up to O(2−n/2) variations, 6 field inversions, 6 point additions, 9 quadratic solver computations and some
negligible operations such as field multiplications, field squares and trace computations.
Proof. The proof consists in evaluating the probability for exiting the two loops. First note that the output
(x, λ) of Algorithm 4 has a specific property, namely λ− x is in the image of QS. Since we want to retrieve
the preimages of a point Q, we have to be sure that λQ − xQ is indeed in that image, which we test for by
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verifying whether Tr(λQ − xQ) = 0. Indeed, all elements of the form QS(z) have zero trace by definition,
and the converse is true for reasons of dimensions. The success probability of this test is exactly 1/2 since
Q is a uniformly random curve point. We thus have on average 2 field inversions, 2 point additions and 2
quadratic solver computations for the internal loop (steps 4 to 8).
The complexity of the external loop demands to evaluate the probabilities for having 0, 2, 4 or 6 preimages
of Q. Since all tests on the trace in Algorithm 5 succeed, independently, with probability 1/2 up to O(2−n/2)
variations7, these probabilities are then, again up to O(2−n/2) variations, 9/32 for 0 preimage, 15/32 for 2
preimages, 7/32 for 4 preimages, and 1/32 for 6 preimages. Thus, the probability for exiting the external loop
is equal to 0 · 9/32+ 1/3 · 15/32+ 2/3 · 7/32+ 1 · 1/32 = 1/3. These probabilities also hold for evaluating
the average cost of an iteration of PREIMAGESSW in term of quadratic computations. With probability 15/32
one such computation will be performed and so on. As a consequence, one iteration of PREIMAGESSW cost
on average 15·1+7·2+1·332 = 1 quadratic solver computation.
To sum up, Algorithm 3 requires on average 3 · 2 field inversions, 3 · 2 additions of points and 3 · (2 + 1)
quadratic solver computations, up to O(2−n/2 variations. ⊓⊔
Note that the efficiency of this algorithm can be improved further by choosing a sparse value of b and a
value of t that yields sparse precomputed constants. Many of the field multiplications will then be computed
faster.
4 Implementation aspects
Our software implementation targets modern Intel Desktop-based processors, making extensive use of the
recently introduced AVX instruction set [16] accessible through compiler intrinsics. The curve choice is the
GLS binary curve (λ2 + λ + a)x2 = x4 + b represented in λ-coordinates and defined over the quadratic
extension F2254 . The extension is built by choosing the irreducible trinomial g(u) = u
2 + u+ 1 over the base
field F2127 defined with the irreducible trinomial f(z) = z
127 + z63 + 1. In this set of parameters, a field
element a is represented as a = a0 + a1u, with a0, a1 ∈ F2127 . For simplicity, parameter t is chosen to be
a random subfield element, allowing the computational savings by sparse multiplications described in the
previous section.
Squaring and multiplication. Field squaring closely mirrors the vector formulation proposed in [3], with
coefficient expansion implemented by table lookups performed through byte-shuffling instructions. The table
lookups operate on registers only, allowing a very efficient constant-time implementation. Field multiplication
is natively supported by the carry-less multiplier (PCLMULQDQ instruction), with the number of word
multiplications reduced through application of Karatsuba formulae, as described in [26]. Modular reduction is
implemented with a shift-and-add approach, with careful choice of aligning vector word shifts on multiples of
8, to explore the faster memory alignment instructions available in the target platform.
Half-trace computation. For an odd extension degreem, the half-trace function HTr : F2m → F2m is defined
by HTr(c) =
∑(m−1)/2
i=0 c
22i and computes a solution c ∈ F2m to the quadratic equation λ2 + λ = c+Tr(c).
In a quadratic extension, the equation λ2 + λ = c + Tr(c) can be solved for c = c0 + c1u ∈ F22m by
computing two half-traces in F2m , as described in [20]. First, solve λ
2
1 + λ1 = c1 to obtain λ1, and then solve
λ20 + λ0 = c0 + c1 + λ1 +Tr(c0 + c1 + λ1) to obtain the solution λ = λ0 + (λ1 +Tr(c0 + c1 + λ1))u. This
approach is very efficient for variable-time implementations and only requires two half-trace computations
in the base field, where each half-trace computation employs a large precomputed table of 28 · ⌈m8 ⌉ field
elements [24].
7 This can be justified rigorously using the fact that the corresponding function field extensions are pairwise linearly disjoint, exactly
as in the image size computations of [18, §4]. For simplicity, we do not include the tedious Galois extension computations involved.
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A more naive approach evaluates the function by alternatingm− 1 consecutive squarings and (m− 1)/2
additions, with the advantage of taking constant-time (if squaring and addition are also constant-time, as in the
case here). We derive a faster way to compute the half-trace function in constant-time over quadratic extension
fields. Applying the naive approach to a quadratic extension allows a significant speedup due to the linear
property of half-trace, by reducing the cost to essentially one constant-time half-trace computation over the
base field. By considering that λ21 + λ1 = c1 has a solution λ1 ∈ F2m , we always have Tr(λ1) = Tr(c1) = 0.
This simplifies the expression above to λ20 + λ0 = c0 + c1 + λ1 +Tr(c0). Substituting d = c0 +Tr(c0), the
expression for λ0 becomes:
λ0 =
(m−1)/2∑
i=0
(d+ c1 + λ1)
22i =
(m−1)/2∑
i=0

d+ c1 +
(m−1)/2∑
j=0
c2
2j
1


22i
.
The expansion of the inner sum allows the interleaving of the consecutive squarings. The analysis can be
split in two cases, depending on the format of the extension degreem:
λ0 =


c0 +
⌊m/4⌋−1∑
i=0
(c160 + d
4 + c41 + c
8
1)
24i ifm ≡ 1 (mod 4)
⌊m/4⌋∑
i=0
(c0 + d
4 + c21 + c
4
1)
24i ifm ≡ 3 (mod 4).
The value λ1 can then be computed as λ1 = λ
2
0 + λ0 + d+ c1, for a total of approximatelym squarings
andm/4 additions, a cost comparable to a single constant-time half-trace in the base field.
Inversion. Field inversion is implemented by two different approaches based on the Itoh-Tsuji algorithm [21].
This algorithm computes a−1 = a(2
m−1−1)2, as proposed in [19], with the cost of m − 1 squarings and
a number of multiplications determined by the length of an addition chain for m − 1. For a variable-
time implementation, the squarings for each 2i-power involved can be converted into a multi-squaring [8],
implemented as a trade-off between space consumption and execution time. Each multi-squaring table requires
the storage of 24 · ⌈m4 ⌉ field elements. A constant-time implementation must perform consecutive squarings
and cannot benefit considerably from a precomputed table of field elements without introducing variance in
the memory hierarchy latency potentially exploitable by an intrusive attacker.
Point addition. The last performance-critical operation to be described is the point addition in λ-affine
coordinates. A formula for adding points P = (xP , yP ) and Q = (xQ, yQ) on the curve is proposed in [24],
with associated cost of 2 inversions, 4 multiplications and 2 squarings :
xP+Q =
xP · xQ(λP + λQ)
(xP + xQ)2
, λP+Q =
xQ · (xP+Q + xP )2
xP+Q · xP + λP + 1.
Simple substitution of xP+Q in the computation of λP+Q gives faster new formulas. By unifying the
denominators, one field inversion can be traded for 2 multiplications in the formulas below, with associated
cost of 1 inversion, 6 multiplications and 2 squarings:
xP+Q =
xP · xQ(λP + λQ)2
(xP + xQ)2(λP + λQ)
, λP+Q =
[
(xP + xQ)
2 + xQ · (λP + λQ)
]2
(xP + xQ)2(λP + λQ)
+ λP + 1.
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Operation Ivy Bridge Haswell
Field squaring 13 15
Sparse multiplication 80 44
Multiplication 94 48
Inversion 959 734
Constant-time inversion 1,783 1,610
Half-trace 55 50
Constant-time half-trace 1,213 1,245
Point addition 1,500 1,026
Constant-time point addition 2,367 2,137
Elligator Squared 23,680 22,850
Constant-time Elligator Squared 52,850 51,750
DH with Elligator Squared 127,430 80,180
EG with Elligator Squared 138,480 83,680
Table 2. Timings for Elligator Squared and underlying field arithmetic in two Intel platforms. Results are in clock cycles and were
taken as the average of 104 executions with random inputs. DH/EG results refer to generating a random point for ECDH (fixed-base)
or ElGamal encryption (variable-base) using the constant-time, timing-attack protected scalar multiplication from [24], and computing
its Elligator Squared representation with variable-time arithmetic.
5 Experimental results
The implementation was realized with help from the latest version of the RELIC toolkit [2]. Random number
generation was implemented with the recently introduced RDRAND instruction [12]. Software was compiled
with a prerelease version of GCC 4.9 available in the Arch Linux distribution with flags for loop unrolling,
aggressive optimization (-O3 level) and specific tuning for the Sandy/Ivy Bridge microarchitectures. Table
2 presents timings in clock cycles for field arithmetic and Elligator Squared in two different platforms – an
Intel Ivy Bridge Core i5 3317U 1.7GHz and a Haswell Core i7 4770K 3.5GHz. The timings were taken as
the average of 104 executions, with TurboBoost and HyperThreading disabled to reduce randomness in the
results.
The constant-time implementation results are mostly for reference: indeed, since the Elligator Squared
operation is efficiently invertible, there is no strong reason to compute it in constant time: timing information
does not leak secret key data like in the case of a scalar multiplication. However, timing information could
conceivably help an active distinguishing attacker; the corresponding attack scenarios are far-fetched, but the
paranoid may prefer to choose constant-time arithmetic as a matter of principle.
6 Comparison of Elligator 2 and Elligator Squared on Prime Finite Fields
We have implemented Elligator 2 [6] and the corresponding Elligator Squared construction on Curve25519 [4]
using the fast arithmetic provided by Bernstein et al. as part of the publicly available implementation of
Curve25519 and Ed25519 [5] in SUPERCOP, in order to compare the two proposed methods on Edwards
curves in large characteristic (and to see how they both perform compared to our binary implementation).
To generate a random point and compute the corresponding bitstring representation, the Elligator method
requires, on average, 2 scalar multiplications, 2 tests for the existence of preimages and 1 preimage com-
putation. On the other hand, for the same computation, Elligator Squared requires, on average, 1 scalar
multiplication, 2 tests for the existence of preimages, 1 preimage computation and 2 computations of the
Elligator 2 map function. As a result, compared to the Elligator approach, the Elligator Squared approach
requires 1 scalar multiplication less, but 2 map function computations more. Therefore, Elligator will be faster
than Elligator Squared in contexts where a scalar multiplication is cheaper than 2map function evaluations and
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Operation Ivy Bridge Haswell
Scalar multiplication (fixed-base) 42,570 42,180
Scalar multiplication (variable-base, est.) 182,490 162,460
Map function 38,420 36,590
DH with Elligator Squared 157,500 141,200
DH with Elligator 2 114,800 100,200
EG with Elligator Squared (est.) 297,420 261,480
EG with Elligator 2 (est.) 394,640 340,760
Table 3. Timings for Elligator Squared and Elligator 2 on Curve25519. Results are in clock cycles and were taken as the average of
104 executions with random inputs. DH/EG are as in Table 2.
conversely. Elligator will thus tend to have an edge for protocols using fixed base point scalar multiplication,
such as ECDH key generation or ECDSA signatures, whereas Elligator Squared will perform better for
protocols using variable base point scalar multiplication, like ElGamal encryption.
This is confirmed by our implementation results, as reported in Table 3, which are 35–40% in favor of
Elligator in the fixed-base case (DH) but 30–35% in favor of Elligator Squared in the variable-base case (EG).
Note that the variable-base scalar multiplication results are estimates based on the SUPERCOP performance
numbers on haswell and hydra2. A comparison with Table 2 shows that the binary curve approach is
25% to 200% times faster than the fastest Curve25519 implementation.
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